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Abstract 
The key point that is arising from the last financial crisis is the need to create a framework for 
macro financial goals and directions in the medium and long term. The main emphasis can be 
putted on the creation of so-called macro prudential policy, which main goal is to prevent the 
materialization of systemic risk in the financial system. Although prudent policies should aim 
to ensure financial stability, the crisis has shown that monetary policy should also take a 
major role in the reaction observation of the  financial developments. It is obvious that 
current macroeconomic models used in monetary 
policymaking suffer from poor understanding of macro financial 
ties and do not include possible financial imbalances, such as 
risk of falls and systemic liquidity risk. Here monetary policy should reach at a level that 
would ensure financial stability. The volume and severity of the financial crisis bring a new 
discussion about the need for new regulatory supervision and monitoring on the financial 
institutions and financial markets. This new regulatory and supervisory framework for 
financial markets and institutions is not placed just at EU level, but also on the global level.  
This paper is elaborating the regulatory and supervisory framework for financial institutions 
at EU level. Also, this paper is covering the global environment in which monetary policy 
persisted, and elaborates the challenges as a result of changes that started with globalization 
in trade and financial fields. 
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Introduction- The basic role of monetary and fiscal policy 
The analysis of traditional role of monetary and fiscal policy begins with an emphasis on 
consensus views of economists and politicians that central banks are responsible for ensuring 
price stability in the medium term. While inflation outlooks remain well secured and fixed, 
monetary policy can and probably should contribute to stabilization. Monetary policy should 
work promptly and efficiently which is a task that is given to technocrats who are entitled to 
act on some degree of discretionary manner, free from political impact, but with a clear legal 
or legitimate mandate. A general view is that monetary policy should have only limited 
distribution effects and acceptable distribution effects of monetary policy are those arising 
from changes in interest rates, with benefit or negative impact on savers and investors.  
In contrast, fiscal policy is leaded by elected politicians and as politics takes strong 
distribution effects through decisions on taxes and public spending. The role of fiscal policy 
after the financial crisis is considered to be limited within the borders of automatic stabilizers. 
The reason for opposing the use of discretionary fiscal policy is a major concern because of 
tenacious budget deficits, unsustainable debt levels, and worries about the capability of the 
political system to deal with tax issues and decisions on fiscal spending quickly and 
effectively to achieve the anticipated stabilization. 
 
Role mismatch  
During the last financial and economic crisis, fiscal policy again remained indecisive and 
powerless in taking clear steps in many countries during the recent financial crisis. Contrary 
to fiscal policy, monetary policy has lifted more to the center of macroeconomic policy, 
ranging from limited to almost unlimited decision making and a sort of carefulness. One 
basic way on which central banks reacted during the crisis was to reduce the interest rates at 
levels that were extremely low, but many central banks implemented other ways to reduce the 
effects and respond appropriately to the crisis. First of all, they applied quantitative easing 
and credit easing, which can be considered as unusual monetary policy measures. Secondly, 
they reduce the quality requirements in the way that they enlarge the list of financial 
instruments that they were accepting as guarantee. The last, but maybe the most important 
was the role of lender of last resort to rescue banks that without the help will collapse. These 
measures put central banks in a position to give predilection to specific group of borrowers, 
such as mortgage banks, industrial companies and governments, and specific sectors such as 
export oriented companies, in contrast to domestic selling oriented companies.  
 
These measures can be justified, as long as we can put these measures of the monetary policy 
as special monetary measures that should be compatible and common with the measures that 
implement the fiscal policy, but on the other hand, it is clearly not according to the traditional 
allocation of the responsibilities and roles that have the monetary and fiscal policy. 
 
Monetary policy and the influence on financial stability 
The key point that is arising from the crisis is the need to create a framework for macro 
financial goals and directions in the medium and long term. The main emphasis can be putted 
on the creation of so-called macro prudential policy, which main goal is to prevent the 
materialization of systemic risk in the financial system. This should be perceived by the 
monetary policy as a positive reaction from the crisis, but it also involves certain tasks. 
 
It will provoke positive reactions from the monetary policy if these macro prudential policies 
succeed in the process of making the financial crises less sharper and with minimal negative 
influence for the whole financial and economic system. This will reduce the necessity for 
monetary policy to react not according to the given goals and be a policy that will clean the 
mess when the crisis will erupt. The central bank should have the main role in this type of 
institutions that will set and govern macro-prudential policy, which will serve not as a 
separate part, but as addition to the monetary policy. 
 Although prudent policies should aim to ensure financial stability, the crisis has shown that 
monetary policy should also take a major role in the reaction observation of the  financial 
developments. It is obvious that current macroeconomic models used in monetary 
policymaking suffer from poor understanding of macro financial 
ties and do not include possible financial imbalances, such as 
risk of falls and systemic liquidity risk. Here monetary policy should reach at a level that 
would ensure financial stability. 
While ideally prudential policies are explicitly those policies that should 
ensure financial stability, in less ideal conditions in which we live the financial stability 
should be supported by monetary policy. Monetary policy should not take additional 
responsibilities and goals that should be done, but  
when price stability is taking into consideration, monetary policy should 
more explicitly take into account the rising financial imbalances 
and as monetary policy to take additional measures and actions to find a way to address these 
imbalances. So, the monetary policy should pay more attention when setting policy regarding 
the evolution of credit and debt, especially when they are going together with the rapid 
growth in asset prices and current account deficits. These are the most important signals for 
the increase of the financial imbalance, which could ultimately jeopardize the financial and 
price stability. The favorable effect of the foregoing is that monetary policy will become 
more symmetric with respect to the economic cycle, with greater representation at a time of 
growth and less need for intervention during the crisis and slowing growth.  
 
New regulatory and supervisory framework for financial institutions at EU level 
The volume and severity of the financial crisis bring a new discussion about the need for new 
regulatory supervision and monitoring on the financial institutions and financial markets. 
This new regulatory and supervisory framework for financial markets and institutions is not 
placed just at EU level, but also on the global level. The need for new regulatory and 
supervisory framework for financial markets and institutions have been set by G20 leaders, 
while the concrete work on the development of policy is being carried out by international 
standard setters, coordinated primarily by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). 
The key regulatory initiatives in the EU, which are among the global regulatory and 
supervisory reform agenda is presented in the next table, clearly presenting the perspectives 
of financial stability and macro prudential policy. 
 
Table 1: Proposals for the banking sector in EU 
Initiative Description Current status 
Banking union A single supervisory mechanism 
with strong ECB powers for the 
supervision of all banks in the euro 
area (in cooperation with national 
supervisory authorities). Further 
components of the proposal: single 
rulebook, common deposit protection 
and single bank resolution 
The European 
Commission’s proposal 
was published in 
September 2012. 
mechanisms. Main aims: avoid 
future banking crises, restore 
confidence in the financial system 
and protect savers.  
Capital Requirements 
Directive and Regulation 
(CRD IV) 
The proposal implements Basel III in 
the EU. Overarching goal is to 
strengthen the resilience of the EU 
banking sector, while ensuring that 
banks continue to finance economic 
activity and growth. The proposal 
consists of a Directive, which relates 
primarily to the national supervisory 
process, and a Regulation, which sets 




was published in July 
2011.”Trialogue” 
negotiations between the 
Commission, the 
European Parliament and 
the Council are ongoing. 
Deposit guarantee 
schemes 
The legislative proposal deals mainly 
with the harmonization and 
simplification of protected deposits, 
a faster pay-out, and an improved 
financing of schemes.  
The European 
Commission’s proposal 
was published in July 
2010. 
Bank resolution The proposed framework sets out the 
necessary steps and powers to ensure 
that bank failures across the EU are 
managed in a way which avoids 
financial instability and minimizes 
costs for taxpayers. The proposed 
tools are divided into powers relating 




was published in June 
2012. 
Revision of the proposal 
after comments from 
Member States and other 
relevant parties. 
Mortgage credit directive The aim of the proposal is to create a 
responsible, efficient, healthy and 
competitive pan-European mortgage 
credit market that works to the 
benefit of consumers, also promoting 
customer mobility, cross-border 
activity of creditors and 
intermediaries, and creating a level 
playing field for all actors involved. 
The European 
Commission’s proposal 
was published in March 
2011. 
Source: Financial Stability Review 2012 
 
One of the basic necessities for actual and legitimate Economic and Monetary Union is the 
foundation of a banking union.  The European Commission published legislative proposal 
which is connected with the Single Supervisory Mechanism (or SSM), which in fact is a step 
toward the banking union. The basic point here is that the building of a banking union is a 
multipart process, but necessary and crucial plan for better and more effective monetary 
union. Obviously after the crisis, there is a need for banking supervision that will be on 
national level in every country part of the Union, and also countries that pretend to be part of 
European and Monetary Union. The problems that occur today in the monetary policy are 
easily transmitted to fiscal policy, and vice versa. On the short run, the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism should stabilize the connections and negative effects between monetary and 
fiscal policy in the country, but at the long term this Mechanism should have much positive 
influence on the Monetary Union and the whole global economy. In fact, the idea is that SSM 
will fulfill the necessity for common supervisory system with common resolution regime.  
 
Concerning the recovery of credit institutions and investment firms, there is a need to avoid 
“contamination” of other institutions from bank failures, which obviously can be done with 
efficient management of these failures. There is a need for specific tools that can be 
implemented from related authorities, which will guarantee the financial stability. Concerning 
the Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS) Directive, the basic point is to maintain financial 
stability in the way that will build up depositor assurance and protect their wealth. The idea 
of Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation (CRD IV) is the implementation of Basel 
Committee’ regulatory framework posted at the global level. The purpose of this framework 
is to increase the confidence of the banking system, sustain the market confidence and 
assuring the work of international banks. This framework is covering all the banks and 
investment companies in EU. This framework requires better capital in financial institutions 
and gives directives concerning the liquidity requirements and leverage. Also, it gives the 
supervisory authorities additional supervisory power and building the way towards unified 
bank regulation. Here, one of the most important things is the incorporation of macro 
prudential policymaking concerning the systematic risk.  
 
Globalization 
The global environment in which monetary policy persisted brings more challenges as a 
result of changes that started with globalization in trade and financial fields. Concerning the 
trade, in the period before the crisis in many western economies targeting low inflation was 
easier with cheaper imported products. Analyzing further, things will probably be different as 
structural upward trend in commodity global prices becomes a dominant factor. So, the tasks 
that the monetary policy has now are more difficult concerning this upward trend. Speaking 
from a financial point of view, after the crisis the capital inflows in developing countries will 
be at higher level. There are many reasons for this. First of all, there are better expected rates 
of return, better growth prospects and macro fundamentals. These capital inflows will require 
from the policymakers to set the economic policies in those countries. They can choose 
between the significant appreciations of the exchange rate, or limit the appreciation by 
intervention in the currency market. In the second case scenario, there is no availability to 
sterilize the intervention, which will lead to increased inflation. Raising rates to lower 
inflation will bring more capital inflows, which will not be positive for the economy in the 
country. 
The emergence of these fluctuations suggests the need for new ways and opportunities for 
developing countries to cope with the challenges they face in large capital inflows. 
Macroeconomic adjustment policies to enable sustainable rate of expansion of aggregate 
demand with lower domestic interest rates may help to limit capital inflows. Macro-
prudential measures can be used to lower the risks in terms of financial stability. This 




All the actions taken by central banks were forced by the severity of the crisis and they were 
inevitable. However, there are five major lessons about the conduct of monetary policy that 
can be learned from the recent crisis. First, there is no doubt that central banks should play a 
role in the economic downturn of the market level and at the level of individual systemically 
important banks. In order to act appropriately, they need room to maneuver, which involves 
significant balance sheet of the central bank with sufficient capital. In normal times, the 
distribution of profits of the central bank should be limited to achieve this goal. In order to be 
able to act in a crisis, central banks need to have a balance to be able to restore the previous 
level after crisis caused by the implementation of unconventional measures. Second, it is 
important to ensure that responsibility is not only transmitted to the central bank. When 
acting on behalf of another authority, central banks need to be very careful (even if they get a 
guarantee on their balance sheet risks). Moreover, when they expanded their activities in time 
of crisis, it is important that they remain within their mandate. Third, central banks must be 
protected from finding the position where they are forced to take action because of the 
inaction of other institutions. Fourth, when making monetary unconventional policies, it is 
important that central banks carefully assess side effects and will set a clear exit strategy from 
the outset. Fifth, there is a need for implementation of the proposals included in the 
regulatory and supervisory framework at EU level. This will alleviate the negative effects of 
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